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ABSTRACT In the last decade, many ransomware attacks had the ability to spread within local networks
or even outside them. At the same time, software defined networking (SDN) has provided a major boost
to networks by transferring intelligence from network devices to a programmable logically centralised
controller. The latter can be programmed to be compatible with the requirements of a wide range of networks
and environments in a straightforward manner. This has motivated researchers to design SDN-based security
solutions against threats targeting traditional networks and systems. This article investigates the use of SDN
to detect and mitigate the risk of self-propagating ransomware. The infamous BadRabbit ransomware has
been used for the proof of concept. To achieve this, an extensive analysis of BadRabbit was performed to
identify its characteristics and understand its behaviour at both the infected device level and at the network
level. As a result, several unique artifacts were extracted fromBadRabbit, which could facilitate its detection.
These artifacts were relied upon to design an SDN-based intrusion detection and prevention system. Our
system comprises five modules, namely deep packet inspection, ARP scanning detection, packet header
inspection, honeypot, and SMB checker. The first two modules have been inspired by other works and have
been included for comparison with the existing solutions. Three other modules rely on novel SDN-based
methods for ransomware detection. We have also evaluated the efficiency and the performance of our system
in terms of detection time, CPU utilisation, as well as TCP and ping latency. Finally, the proposed approach
has also been tested for other ransomware families, such as WannaCry and NotPetya. Our experimental
results show that the system is effective in terms of detecting self-propagating ransomware and outperforms
other proposed approaches.
INDEX TERMS Self-propagating ransomware, intrusion detection and prevention, SDN security, BadRabbit
detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
As technology advances and different types of systems
become connected to the Internet, cyberthreats are increasing
in extent and impact. Ransomware is one such threat which
has benefited from people’s dependence on new technologies
and applications. This threat is a new, unlawful business
model emerging from previously known notions of ‘‘black-
mail’’. This model exploits organizations’ and individuals’
increasing need for and dependence on their data by denying
them access and requesting ransom in return for restoration
of such [1]. Unfortunately, this business model has proved
highly successful since 2013 and has accordingly resulted in
significant financial losses [2]. The evolution of ransomware
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Giacomo Verticale .
went through many stages of development as it appeared
from a virus that infects vulnerable systems until achieving
the ability to self-propagate within a network. Moreover,
ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) has increased the risk of
this threat by giving non-professionals access to this type of
tool, and thus increasing the number of potential sources of
delivery [1].
Despite the existence of several defences that have pre-
vented the payment of over $100M illegal income for crim-
inals in 2019, ransomware was categorized as one of the
highest threats in 2019 according to the Europol report
to assess the threat of organized crime online [3]. Some
of the largest ransomware attacks occurred in 2017, when
three different types of ransomware were deployed, namely
WannaCry, Petya/NotPetya and BadRabbit [4]. In the litera-
ture, WannaCry and Petya have been adequately studied and
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the functions and methods they use to propagate and imple-
ment their goals are relatively well understood [5]–[9]. On the
contrary, adequate studies are not available for BadRabbit.
It has used more advanced techniques such as the targeted
attack on Eastern European countries. This resulted in hitting
important government sectors such as Odessa International
Airport [10]. Therefore, understanding the mechanism by
which this type of targeted ransomware operates is one of the
major objectives of our work.
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a major devel-
opment for networks, which has enhanced their flexibility
through the transfer of intelligence and decision making from
the data plane to a logically centralised controller [11]. This
development has motivated well-known technology compa-
nies such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft to support
this technology through the funding of the Open Network-
ing Foundation (ONF) to develop standards for SDN [11].
Moreover, Google has networked its data centres using SDN,
which is expected to greatly enhance the applicability of
SDN-based systems in the future [12]. Consequently, exam-
ining security threats on traditional networks and finding
solutions to them through the use of SDN, may allow for
the provision of a suitable security architecture that can be
applied in the future. Despite that, not many SDN-based solu-
tions have been proposed to mitigate the risk of various types
of ransomware. The proposed solutions are mostly limited to
restricting the risk of malware families such as CryptoWall,
Locky, WannaCry, Cerber, and ExPetr [13]–[17]. Therefore,
studying previous solutions and providing SDN-based solu-
tions to mitigate the risk from BadRabbit is another incentive
point.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II
we review related works on SDN-based malware and ran-
somware detection. In Section III we state the problem and
discuss the limitations of existing solutions. We also justify
our approach and discuss the novelty of our work compared
with the existing works. In Section IV we perform a compre-
hensive static and dynamic analysis of BadRabbit.We present
its unique features which can be used to improve the detec-
tion. In Sections V and VI we present the design and the
implementation of our proposed system that comprises five
modules. In Sections VII and VIII we present our experi-
mental setup and our evaluation results. Besides BadRabbit,
the proposed approach has also been tested againstWannaCry
and NotPetya, and has been compared with existing ran-
somware detection approaches. Finally, Section IX concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the most important and recent
SDN-based works on malware detection in general and on
ransomware detection in particular.
A. SDN-BASED MALWARE DETECTION
One of the first efforts to utilize SDN as a security solution
against malware was by Jin and Wang [18]. The authors
were motivated by the flexibility that SDN delivers and the
associated controller programmability. Their proposals are
based on detecting mobile malware by assuming that mobiles
are connected to access point SDN switches. In their imple-
mentation, Jin andWang proposed four detection algorithms:
1) Using internal or external IPs blacklists, to match with
the connections requested by the phones.
2) Based on the assumption that the number of successful
connections will be greater than failed connections
in healthy phones, they suggested using a connection
success ratio algorithm to compare successful com-
munications with failures, as the probability that the
device is infected increases with an increasing number
of its failed connections. To achieve successful detec-
tion, the authors suggested using a predefined value
for the difference between the two connections. For
example, in the event that the number of unsuccessful
connections was greater than successful connections
by 20, the device would be blocked.
3) Based on the assumption that communications from
uninfected devices will occur at lower rate and to
recently accessed destinations, the authors suggested
implementing a recently accessed hosts list to allow
phones to access the destinations in the list without
forwarding to the controller. Otherwise, required access
destinations from a specific device are placed in a
queue, and if this exceeds a certain number per sec-
ond, the device would be blocked. Otherwise, access
is allowed and the destination is added to the Recently
Accessed Hosts.
4) Implementing an algorithm to analyse similar patterns
on the network, assuming that malware might infect
other phones in the network. These devices perform
similar activities in terms of their communications such
as identical destinations, similar connection time dura-
tion, and that they have the same operating systems.
Evaluation consists of measuring the delay and the maximum
number of packets handled by the controller by using Cbench
as a simulator to generate packets from 10,000 unique MAC
addresses for 10 seconds. This process was repeated 10 times,
as it was found that if using the four algorithms the delay
increases by 3.2%, while the number of packets processed by
the controller decreases by 27.9%.
Ceron et al. [19] discussed the difficulties inherent to
analysing modern malware that only activates under certain
conditions such as the type of network, network structure,
and interactions within the network, as some malware may
be difficult to analyse in traditional analysis environments
due to its development and its identification of predetermined
targets. Therefore, they suggest using SDN as a solution to
overcome this issue, as SDN allows considerable flexibility
in terms of controlling and modifying the network structure.
Ceron et al. assessed their proposal by analysing 50 malware
samples in three different environments: an open environment
with no restrictions, which resulted in a mean of 38.94 events
being detected; a partial environment with some open ports,
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resulting in a mean of 30.04 events being detected; and
a closed environment, which was a closed local network
without any Internet connection, which resulted in a mean
of 18.90 events being detected.
B. SDN-BASED RANSOMWARE DETECTION
When the scope is narrowed to mitigating the risk of ran-
somware using SDN, to the best of our knowledge, only five
pieces of work have discussed the use of SDN as a secu-
rity solution to detect and mitigate ransomware [13]–[17].
These works can be divided into two categories: ransomware
with worm capabilities and non-spreading ransomware. For
non-spreading ransomware, the aim is to prevent the vic-
tim’s device being encrypted, while for ransomware with
worm capabilities, the aim is to prevent the victim’s device
being encrypted in addition to preventing the spread of the
ransomware within, and indeed, outside the local network.
Table 1 summarises the features of the proposed approaches
in the literature, whereas Table 2 gives a comparison between
the proposed solutions to mitigate the risk of ransomware.
These works are briefly reviewed below.
TABLE 1. SDN-based ransomware detection approaches proposed in the
literature.
Cabaj and Mazurczyk [13] studied CryptoWall 3.0, which
is a non-spreading ransomware. They proposed a solution to
prevent the victim’s device being encrypted by matching the
domains used in external communications with a dynamic
blacklist. Thus, the communication between the infected
device and the command and control (C&C) server is detected
and the exchange of the encryption key is stopped, which
leads to the encryption being suspended. The authors also
proposed another solution to provide better time efficiency,
which is to keep the communication in progress between
the devices and external parties without the need to wait for
the SDN controller’s instructions, and to forward a copy to
the SDN controller. The latter then performs the inspection
and blocks any ongoing communication with a suspicious
domain. Moreover, a comparison between the iptables fire-
wall and the proposed approaches has been made, which
showed that iptables might lead to delay of 300 ms on inser-
tion of 1000 new rules, while both suggested approaches have
a maximum delay of only 180 ms. In a follow up work,
Cabaj et al. [14] utilized SDN to detect two families of
non-spreading ransomware, namely CryptoWall and Locky.
In their implementation of the proposed solution, they used
the size of the first three HTTP Post messages sequentially as
a detection method, which achieved a 97-98% true positive
rate and a 2-3% false positive rate.
In another solution that is based on the characteristics
of the messages exchanged between the controller and the
ransomware, Cusack et al. [15] found that cyber-criminals
began to change the protocol used to communicate between
themselves and their ransomware. They used HTTPS to
encrypt these messages, which prevents the inspection pro-
cess. Hence, the authors proposed a solution based on the
unencrypted part of HTTPS, specifically the header, to detect
malware using machine learning (ML). To demonstrate the
feasibility of their solution, they tested it against the Cerber
ransomware, which resulted in an 87% true positive rate.
When it comes to ransomware with worm-spreading capa-
bilities, researchers have studied two related families: Wan-
naCry and ExPetr. For WannaCry [16], the suggestion is to
use two applications. The first uses a dynamic IP blacklist
to detect WannaCry’s communication with its C&C, which
prevents the victim’s device from being encrypted. The sec-
ond applicationmonitors the ports used byWannaCry (specif-
ically ports 139, 445, 443, 9001, and 9050) to detect and
block WannaCry’s self-propagating within and outside the
network, in addition to preventing the encryption process.
The authors tested their solution, which resulted in successful
detection and blocking ofWannaCry. It is worth noting that in
their second application, three ports belonging to a legitimate
service used routinely, specifically 443 for HTTPS, 445 for
SMB, and 139 for NetBIOS, were blocked. For ExPetr [17],
the suggested solutions are based on blocking suspicious
ports as well as inspecting HTTP and SMB payloads. In the
case of the organization in question not using SMB, the port
blocker can be applied to block any connection that attempts
to use SMB.Where SMB is a legitimate service, SMBpackets
are inspected to search for a Bitcoin address; if the address
is found, the connection would be blocked for a pre-defined
time duration (e.g., 90 minutes). Similarly, the HTTP packet
inspection method is used to search for PROPFIND in order
to identify attempts to connect to the admin$ shared folder.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we state the problem and identify the limi-
tations of the existing solutions. We also explain and justify
our approach. As shown in Table 2, only two of the existing
solutions consider ransomware with worm (self-propagating)
capabilities. That is, [13]–[15] propose approaches to detect
ransomware communications with the C&C, in order, for
example, to prevent a victim’s device from being encrypted.
On the other hand, approaches proposed in [16], [17] attempt
to detect ransomwares’ attempts to spread within a network.
Our results of the BadRabbit ransomware analysis given later
in Section IV indicate that a system infectedwith the BadRab-
bit ransomware does not make attempts to communicate
with third parties, as it depends on generating an encryption
key using Microsoft libraries and then encrypting this key
with a public key in a form of behaviour similar to that
of ExPetr [17]. The aim of our work is to detect attempts
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TABLE 2. Comparison of ransomware detection and prevention approaches using SDN.
to spread ransomware at the network level rather than to
prevent device encryption, which has already been addressed
in previous works.
Solutions presented in [16], [17] may result in high
numbers of false positives by blocking an unnecessary high
number of legitimate users. Moreover, they are essentially
dependent on the network not needing the SMB service.
This would allow port blocking as a solution to prevent
ransomware from spreading. These solutions are effective in
this regard, but do not take into account the possibility of the
need for this service on the network, thus preventing users
from accessing a legitimate service. In [17], as an alternative
solution the authors suggested inspecting HTTP and SMB
packets to search for the specific values that ExPetr uses, such
as the Bitcoin address and the admin$ folder name. This
solution may be useful in preventing ExPetr from spreading
but may not prevent other types of ransomware because of
the need for prior knowledge, such as Bitcoin addresses, file
names, or other unique strings.
In fact, all the solutions discussed above assume the con-
troller’s ability to access and analyse the packets very rapidly.
The controller’s capabilities in this regard, the network size,
and typical amounts of traffic have not been studied suf-
ficiently. Indeed, it is difficult for the controller to inspect
all the traffic destined for a specific service or analyse the
domains or IP addresses used, especially if the network con-
tains a large number of running devices. The difficulty here is
based on the network performance, as additional inspection
means increased delays and/or degradation in performance.
Therefore, a general solution must be found that detects
different types of ransomware without affecting significantly
the efficiency of the network and the requirements of its
users. As an alternative solution, a honeypot could provide
these features and is a proportionate and efficient solution
investigated in our work.
The use of honeypot as a ransomware solution has
been suggested in a number of studies. For example,
Gomez-Hernandez et al. in [20] use a honeypot to detect
ransomware, suggesting that files on the network devices can
be deployed to act as a means of threat detection. These files
are connected to a monitoring process, and therefore, when
opening or reading any of these files, the process responsible
will be detected and then blocked. The authors discussed
the advantages of their proposal, stating that this approach
does not require the application of initial training or prior
knowledge of threats, thus allowing for efficient detection
of unknown threats. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the
approach, files were distributed across a Linux network,
where Bash-Ransomware and Linux.Encoder were used as
samples, and WannaCry was also used by using WineHQ to
run it. This method achieved a 100% detection rate. Recently,
several types of honeypots have been proposed for the spe-
cific detection of ransomware. For instance, shared folders
with other devices, a web server, a fake memory partition,
a file and e-mail or pictures as tokens. These traps were
trialled against six types of ransomware, including Cryp-
toWall, which was run 50 times on the device and for which a
100% detection rate was achieved [21]. In other words, these
solutions are based on the creation of a sample that is not used
by the network or its clients, and thus any attempt to reach it
can reasonably be considered suspicious.
In fact, the honeypot approach may be an effective and
straightforward solution to implement, whether at the net-
work level using systems to act as traps, as suggested in [21],
or at the level of devices, as suggested in [20], by using
files to act as traps. The effectiveness and privilege of this
approach lies in its ease of implementation and its ability to
detect unknown threats. On the other hand, each approach has
negative aspects, which for this approach lies in the demand
for a considerable awareness on the part of the network’s
users not to access these files or systems, whereby any access
to these traps will be considered suspicious and thus the
device or process responsible for access is blocked, resulting
in a false positive detection.
On the other hand, regardless of the drawbacks of the traffic
inspection previously discussed, payload inspection has also
been used in this work as a supplementarymeasure tomitigate
the spread of BadRabbit within a given network. In particular,
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the following modules are suggested by [19] for designing
an SDN-based malware analysis architecture. These modules
are working on top of the POX controller:
1) Inspection: This inspects the traffic within the net-
work as well as the traffic directed outside the network
to match it with predefined values such as specific
IP addresses, specific values used by malware, and
specific ports. In the event of a match, either the con-
tainment, the configuration manager, or the analysis
control module is assigned to deal with connection
based on the possible associated risk. For example, not
allowing malware to attack predefined external desti-
nations using the containment module.
2) Containment: This is used to mitigate the risk from
malware using OpenFlow to install rules in SDN
switches, as the risk can be one of either spreading to
or attacking other internal/external devices.
3) Configuration Manager: This is used to create changes
to the network to analyse malware activities in several
environments, where changes can be implemented to
the network topology by adding or deleting services
(such as adding a web server or removing an SMTP
server), or configuring the network to be similar to a
university network.
4) Analysis Control: This is used for the safety control of
the analysis process. The module enables the controller
to re-execute themalware several times as well as revert
the device to a clean state.
Note, that the aformetioned modules have not been adopted
as part of the existing ransomware detection mechanisms
(i.e., [16], [17]). We believe that they deserve attention and
have been considered in our proposed design.
IV. BadRabbit ANALYSIS
In this section, the main findings from our extensive analysis
of BadRabbit ransomware are presented. The main machine
specifications that were used in the analysis are: Intel Core i7
8550U, 1.80 GHz, and 16GB RAM. To perform the analysis,
VirtualBox was used to host the virtual machines (VMs). For
the static analysis, two VMs were used: Windows 10 and
REMnux. For dynamic analysis, four VMs were hosted, with
the following roles: REMnux as a gateway where the other
systems were linked to it and also as a fake HTTP service,
two Windows 10 systems, one infected with BadRabbit and
the other healthy, and one Windows 7 system.
A. THE WORM COMPONENT
By analysing the BadRabbit main file, it was found that the
file size is large but contains little data in the source code.
In addition, there is a presence of two suspicious entropy
values (Figure 1). This suggests that the file is compressed or
encrypted. After the file was executed in a safe environment,
it was found that the file works as a dropper for another file,
specifically the worm file named infpub.dat. The worm
file itself has been coded to work for propagation within the
local network, in addition to a drop-in for three other files.
FIGURE 1. The dropper entropy.
Two of these files are dropped into the Windows directory,
while the third is dropped into the Windows Temp folder.
These files are:
• Dispci.exe: Performs the encryption and decryption
with the help of the DiskCryptor driver, cscc.dat,
which encrypts files individually based on their
extensions.
• Cscc.dat: A legitimate file recognised as a DiskCryp-
tor driver, and which is used to encrypt/decrypt system
partitions. In this instance, cscc.dat encrypts all the
disk partitions.
• Random Value.tmp: A Mimikatz tool used to
extract account authentication data from the system.
The worm component runs the above files as follows:
• In order to run the DiskCryptor driver, the malicious
file (infpub.dat) creates a service called Windows
Client Side Caching DDriver.
• Schedules a task to execute the dispci.exe file.
• Uses ConnectNamePipe as a communication point with
the Mimikatz tool.
Also, the worm component schedules three system tasks,
which are:
• Rhaegal: runs the dispci.exe file each time the sys-
tem is turned on.
• Drogon: reboots the system once to enable the encryp-
tion process.
• Viserion: shuts down the system after the completion of
the encryption process.
B. THE ENCRYPTION COMPONENT
A high-level analysis of the encryption component
(dispci.exe) reveals that the file contains false infor-
mation to deceive the user and to hide its true nature. This
information was extracted using the Pescanner tool, where
the file was described as a Microsoft Display Class Installer
and the product name given as GrayWorm. However, signa-
ture scans indicate that it is a diskcoder typically used by
Windows-based ransomware (Figure 2). For a more accurate
analysis the strings were extracted; it was found that the file
contains an RSA-2048 key and 113 file extensions. To under-
stand the encryption mechanism, the libraries and functions
used were extracted. It was found that the ADVAPI32.dll
library functions are used extensively to generate keys and
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FIGURE 2. Dispci.exe PE header.
to perform the encryption and decryption processes; these
functions are presented in Table 3. It is worth noting that
CryptDestroyKey is used to destroy the encryption key after
using it. Moreover, the functions CryptImportPublicKeyInfo,
CryptStringToBinaryW, CryptDecodeObjectEx, and Crypt-
BinaryToStringW from the CRYPT32.dll library are used
to load the integrated public key to encrypt the file encryption
key.
TABLE 3. Functions used by the encryption component.
The extensions of the files that are encrypted by BadRabbit
are given in Appendix A. The malware author’s public key
(RSA-2048) is given in Appendix B.
C. ENCRYPTION PROCESS
The encryption component file (dispci.exe) operates as
follows. It first invokes the malware author’s public key using
CryptImportPublicKeyInfo and then calls the file exten-
sions. After that, the disk is accessed through the use of
the command ArcName\multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)
partition (1)\, and an attempt is made to access dif-
ferent file system formats, such as NTFS, FAT12, FAT16,
and FAT32. Next, the AES-CBC 128-bit key is generated
using the CryptGenRandom function, and then file mapping
begins to encrypt the files (Figure 3). It is worth noting that
there are exceptions to some folders, these folders are App-
Data, ProgramData, Program Files, and Windows. After the
encryption is complete, the AES key is itself encrypted using
the author’s public key, and a Readme.txt file containing
information about the payment mechanism and the encrypted
key is dropped in the C path. Noticeably, the file also drops
a shortcut of itself called DECRYPT onto the desktop for the
decryption.
D. NETWORK ENUMERATION
BadRabbit depends on various methods to enumerate the
devices on the network. Some of these methods depend
on the active connections in the network, while others
depend on the extraction of network device addresses
FIGURE 3. File mapping.
(whether active or inactive) through ARP requests. These
enumeration methods work as follows:
• By extracting recent TCP connections from GetExtend-
edTcpTable, which contains a group consisting of the
IP addresses and ports communicated within a network.
• By using the GetIpNetTable function, which enumerates
the network’s ARP entries in a table specifying the phys-
ical addresses, and returns this information in a table
structure.
• By using NetServerEnum to extract the addresses of all
servers in the network, whether all servers generally or
servers that contain a specific service.
• Utilizing the Windows Server DHCP Services API via
the DhcpEnumSubnetClients, DhcpEnumSubnets, and
DhcpGetSubnetInfo functions to extract subnets and
clients in subnets, in addition to extracting information
about a specific client.
E. PROPAGATION METHODS
BadRabbit makes several attempts to spread within the net-
work using four methods detailed below:
1. The worm component runs the Mimikatz tool to extract
the authentication information from the infected system and
the Active Directory in Windows networks. The worm file
first drops a temporary file there with a random name and
then creates a named pipe to act as a point of communica-
tion between the worm and the tool as shown in Figure 4.
After that, it runs the tool using the command line, where
the command used to run the tool contains the name of the
temporary file in addition to the name of the named pipe
created (Figure 5). Furthermore, the worm attempts to use the
WindowsManagement Interface Command (WMIC) in order
to access the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
through the use of any extracted passwords and usernames.
2. Using the authentication information extracted by the
Mimikatz tool, BadRabbit attempts to access SMB shared
services. If unsuccessful, the worm contains a list of user-
names and passwords that it can use to launch a dictionary
attack against network devices that use SMB. Appendix C
reports the built-in usernames used by the worm, while the
integrated passwords are given in Appendix D.
3. Attempts to copy the files infpub.dat and
cscc.dat to the admin$ folder, by establishing a remote
connection to admin$, and then copying BadRabbit files
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FIGURE 4. Creation of a named pipe to act as a line of communication
between Mimikatz and the worm file.
FIGURE 5. The command used to run Mimikatz and the named pipe.
to the same folder. After that, BadRabbit can be executed
remotely.
4. The worm component exploits one of MS17-010’s vul-
nerabilities called EternalRomance. It is an SMB vulnerabil-
ity previously leaked by The Shadow Brokers group to spread
across the network, where this is one of several vulnerabilities
that resulted from poor handling of transactions. According
to the Cisco Talos Intelligence Group [22], exploiting the vul-
nerability is similar to one of the exploits that was published
on GitHub [23]. Appendix E shows two snippets from the
worm source code, showing the similarity between the exploit
published in [23] and the worm file. These snippets describe
the use of the strings ‘‘Frag’’ and ‘‘Free’’ to match them in the
response analysis stage. In case of a match, the information
leakage is successful and there is an opportunity for the
continuation of the exploit [24].
F. DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES
From BadRabbit worm file source code analysis we found
that certain defensive techniques have been deployed to avoid
detection and hinder the code analysis. The first task per-
formed by the worm component (infpub.dat) is to gen-
erate hashes for all processes running on the infected device.
Afterwards, the presence of specific hashes is checked, where
these values represent the hashes for antivirus software; more
precisely, the hashes of Dr. Web and McAfee products. Deal-
ing with these processes is dependent on the antivirus used.
For example, in the case of matching any of these hashes,
certain malicious tasks such as accessing SMB shared folders
will not be performed. Furthermore, the worm file applies
anti-debugging techniques; the IsDebuggerPresent function
is used to determine any debuggers running and then disavow
the debugger by placing traps to prevent it from properly
monitoring any processes being performed (Figures 6 and 7).
FIGURE 6. Using the function IsDebuggerPresent to identify debugger
existence.
FIGURE 7. Traps created for debuggers.
After completion of its activities, the worm deletes the
records to prevent an analyst from tracking the opera-
tions that occurred on the infected machine. This is done
by deleting the logs in System, Security, Application, and
Setup, as shown in Figure 8. Also, the fsutil.exe usn
deletejournal/D %c command is executed to delete
the existing Update Sequence Number, as it is considered a
record containing all changes that occurred on files.
G. NETWORK ACTIVITY
1) TEST SCENARIOS AND CONFIGURATIONS
BadRabbit’s network activity was captured by running the file
under four different scenarios to more accurately understand
its behaviour. These scenarios share the structure described
in Figure 9 using the network configuration shown in Table 4,
but differ in terms of the victims’ devices. Specifically, aWin-
dows 10 system with IP address 10.0.0.4 and a Windows 7
system with IP address 10.0.0.6, where some additional mod-
ifications were made to these systems. Ransomware exe-
cution is performed in the Windows 10 system with IP
address 10.0.0.5 The REMnux system acts as a gateway with
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FIGURE 8. Deleting the log records.
FIGURE 9. The lab scheme used in static and dynamic analysis.
TABLE 4. Systems used in network-level analysis and their assigned IP
addresses.
IP address 10.0.0.3. The modifications that have been made
and the scenarios that have been considered are as follows:
• Scenario 1: Two Windows systems are connected to
the network. One system is running Windows 7 that
has a password that does not exist in the ransomware’s
dictionary attack list. The second system is Windows
10 and has the same authentication information as the
infected system. The reason for using such a structure is
to identify the order in which BadRabbit propagates and
the techniques it uses to do so.
• Scenario 2: One Windows 7 system is connected
to the network which is unpatched with regard to
MS17-010 vulnerabilities. Furthermore, SMBv1 authen-
tication has been activated in both the infected system
and the Windows 7 system. As a result, it can be
determined whether the ransomware has exploited the
EternalRomance vulnerability or not.
• Scenario 3:OneWindows 10 system is connected to the
network but which has different authentication informa-
tion that is also not in the ransomware’s dictionary list.
This has been done to monitor ransomware activity in an
otherwise well-secured network.
• Scenario 4: Two Windows systems are connected to the
network, one of which is a Windows 10 system with a
username and a password that exists in the ransomware’s
dictionary list, whilst the other one is a Windows 7 with
a password that does not exist in the list or that is used
by other devices on the network.
Although there is no clear evidence about the use of web
services using web transmission protocols such as HTTP
and HTTPS from the static analysis, there is a possibility
that BadRabbit copies itself through the admin$ folder,
as explained previously in Section IV-E. This could be
achieved through an extension of HTTP calledWebDAV [25].
To verify this hypothesis, INetSim was used to act as a
simulator for web services, and indeed other services as well.
Our findings are presented in the following subsection.
2) BadRabbit ACTIVITIES IN THE CONSIDERED SCENARIOS
The traffic that was generated by the infected system
was analysed using Wireshark. This has revealed the steps
BadRabbit follows to self-propagate in each of the tested
scenarios. In general, the infected system first checks the
availability of two services in other clients, specifically the
HTTP and SMB services. After identifying clients that use
the SMB protocol, an attempt is made to establish a connec-
tion between the infected system and systems that use SMB
by using authentication information stolen from the session
(Figure 10). The stolen authentication information belongs
only to the infected system, thanks for not using the Active
Directory in the network. However, in the case of using the
Active Directory, all the extracted passwords will be tried
against each client.
If the connection attempt is unsuccessful, another method
of propagating within the network is used by exploiting
the EternalRomance vulnerability. To do this, the infected
system tries to find vulnerable systems through sending
SMB requests that contain the dialect NT LM 0.12, which
represents SMB NTLMv1 challenge-response authentication
protocol. If the receiver is using SMBv1, the response will
include the same dialect which is an indicator of EternalRo-
mance vulnerability existence possibility (Figure 11). Also,
by monitoring the SMB connections it was observed that
fixed sizes are used for the first three packets. In partic-
ular, first the infected system sends a request with a size
of 127 bytes, then receives an answer with a size of 228,
and then sends a request with a size of 232. Another attempt
to spread, but against specific victims, is by contacting
clients/servers that use web services (specifically, the HTTP
protocol on port 80) and then trying to access the admin$
shared folder through HTTP PROPFIND (Figure 12).
Furthermore, the infected system launches a dictio-
nary attack on NTLMSSP authentication as a target to
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FIGURE 10. An attempt to identify available HTTP and SMB services on
clients and an unsuccessful attempt to log in via SMB using stolen
information.
FIGURE 11. An attempt to use SMBv1.
FIGURE 12. An attempt to access the admin$ share folder using HTTP
PROPFIND.
access SMB. In some connections, the infected system also
tries to access the SMB shared folders, as shown in Figure 13.
After completing these actions, the infected system performs
a full network scan using ARP to extract the clients connected
to the network; the infected system sends ARP queries three
times for each address in the network. It is worth noting that
the process of scanning the network using ARP is widely used
by different families of ransomware, such as WannaCry.
In scenario 1, after identifying clients who use SMB,
an attempt is made to communicate with these clients through
the use of authentication information stolen from the session.
In case the connection succeeds (as is the case in this sce-
nario) between the infected system (10.0.0.5) and the clean
Windows 10 system (10.0.0.4), the infected system requests
a connection to admin$, and then checks the presence of
the cscc.dat file. If the file is found, it is opened. In the
absence of the file, a error is raised. After that the infected
system inquires about the existence of theinfpub.datfile.
If the file exists, it is overwritten. In the absence of such a
file, the file is created and data is transferred to it (Figure 14).
When the file transmission is complete, the DCE/RPC proto-
col is used to request a query of SVCCTL by using DCE/RPC
Endpoint Mapper (EPM) and then calling it to control Win-
dows services, especially StartServiceW, to execute the ran-
somware (Figure 15). After the process is over, the infected
FIGURE 13. An attempt to access SMB share folders.
FIGURE 14. Successful authentication using credentials stolen from the
session.
FIGURE 15. Using the DCE/RPC and EPM protocols to request SVCCTL.
system also lunches a dictionary attack on the other
systems to authenticate through NTLMSSP as explained
earlier.
In scenario 2, the infected system performs the same steps
described previously and in the same order, starting from
checking the services used and then trying to log into the
SMB shared folders using the stolen authentication data.
In this scenario, however, if the connection is not success-
ful, the infected system determines the clients using HTTP
and then attempts to access admin$ through PROPFIND
requests supported by an extension to the HTTP proto-
col, namely WebDAV. This protocol provides file sharing
and remote control service. As this protocol is not config-
ured on the REMnux system, this method was not success-
ful, as shown in Figure 16. After that, the infected device
tries to exploit the SMB vulnerability on the Windows 7
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FIGURE 16. An attempt to move suspicious files to the admin$ folder.
device (10.0.0.6), but this was not successful either. Two
experiments were performed: one using the SMBv1 protocol
and the other using SMBv2. In both, the infected system did
not succeed in exploiting the vulnerability correctly, despite
the evidence in the static analysis of coding to attempt to
use the EternalRomance vulnerability. In practice, however,
no evidence was found to verify this.
In scenario 3, the goal is to analyse the activities carried out
by the infected system after themalware propagationmethods
within the network have completed. Our experiments show
that the infected system performs only the usual propagation
processes as in the previous scenarios.
In scenario 4, the infected system first tried the stolen
authentication data on Windows 10 system (10.0.0.4), and
then on Windows 7 (10.0.0.6); the two attempts did not
succeed. After that, an effort was made to launch a dictionary
attack on Windows 7, and that did not succeed either. How-
ever, afterwards BadRabbit did not move to the other system
(10.0.0.4) to start a dictionary attack. It is worth noting that
this behavior was observed through many attempts to analyse
BadRabbit dynamically, as the infected system launches a
dictionary attack on only the last system, attempted to log
into it.
After the self-propagation process within the network is
completed, the infected system is restarted to complete the
file encryption process. After that, when trying to reboot
the system, a message appears asking to pay the ransom
amount. This is because BadRabbit rewrites the Master Boot
Record (MBR), which makes the device unable to access the
operating system.
V. RANSOMWARE DETECTION SYSTEM: DESIGN
To design effective solutions against BadRabbit, both our
analysis (in Section IV) as well as the solutions proposed in
the literature (in Section II) have been taken into account.
We have reviewed and evaluated the proposed solutions
against ransomware activities and have taken into consider-
ation their efficiency and the extent of their impact on the
network performance. As a result, we have designed and
implemented an SDN-based intrusion detection and preven-
tion system (IDPS) comprising five modules. This sections
describes the system design, whereas Section VI provides
the implementation details using POX SDN controller. The
IDPS detects and blocks self-propagating ransomware, such
as BadRabbit. Two of the modules, namely Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI)-based and ARP-scanning based detection,
have been inspired by the work of [17]. At the same time,
three novel modules/methods have been developed, namely
Packet Header Inspection (PHI), the use of a honeypot, and a
detection based on SMB packet size.
A. MODULE 1: DEEP PACKET INSPECTION (DPI)
As identified in Section IV, BadRabbit attempts to trans-
fer a file when SMB authentication succeeds or via HTTP
PROPFIND requests. This file has a fixed and unique name,
infpub.dat, and there are no services known by this name.
For the purposes of detection, HTTP and SMB traffic inspec-
tion are used to search for the name of this file. Figure 17
gives a high-level representation of the concept.
FIGURE 17. Conceptual design of DPI detection framework.
Algorithm 1 shows the mechanism for applying the
DPI-based method. The following steps are performed
sequentially when a new packet arrives:
1) The switch forwards packets to the controller.
2) The SMB and HTTP inspection applications at con-
troller match the destination port with the ports used
for the HTTP and SMB services, specifically ports 80,
445 and 139.
3) In the case of non-matching, the controller forwards
the packet to the forwarding.l2_learning component,
which means that the controller will not inspect the
following incoming packets.
4) In the case of matching, all the subsequent incoming
traffic is inspected. This is done by forwarding the
packet, and then halting the event before it reaches the
forwarding.l2_learning component.
5) The controller checks each incoming packet to search
for the infpub.dat string.
6) In the event of matching, the sender of the packets is
blocked through the installation of a new rule to the
switch to prevent it from sending any packets from the
source port to the clients.
B. MODULE 2: PACKET HEADER INSPECTION (PHI)
BadRabbit attempts to reach systems that have an active
SMBv1 protocol. To do this, BadRabbit uses the NT LM
0.12 dialect in SMB requests in the packets sent to other
systems. SMBv1 has numerous known security vulnerabili-
ties and therefore any attempt to use it should be considered
suspicious and require attention [26], [27]. Inspecting the first
packet of each SMB connection to search for the NT LM
0.12 dialect represents an effective solution to preventing
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if packet is None then
return
else if packet.dstport == 80 or 445 or 139 then
if packet.find(‘‘infpub.dat’’) = True then
Install new entry to block the sender MAC








BadRabbit from propagating across a network and, indeed,
preventing the use of this unsafe protocol within the network
in general. Figure 18 gives a high-level representation of the
concept.
FIGURE 18. Conceptual design of the PHI detection framework.
Algorithm 2 explains the steps used to implement the
PHI-based method. This approach successively performs the
following steps:
• Parsing packets to determine if the packet is TCP.
• If the packet is TCP, then the ports to which the packets
are sent are matched to the SMB ports, specifically
ports 445 and 139.
• If the packet is directed to one of these ports, the pack()
function is used to convert the packet into strings. Then,
the find() function is used to search for the NT LM
0.12 dialect.
• In case the dialect is present in the packet,
of.ofp_flow_mod is used to direct the switch to add a
new flow entry that blocks the MAC address of the
packet sender from sending any packet that has the same
destination port (139 or 445).
• If the dialect is not found, the packet is returned to
the forwarding.l2_learning component. As a result,
the incoming traffic will not be inspected.




if packet is None then
return
else if packet.dstport == 445 or 139 then
if packet.find(‘‘NT LM 0.12’’) = True then
Install new entry to block the sender MAC







C. MODULE 3: HONEYPOT-BASED
Based on the results of BadRabbit dynamic analysis, pre-
sented in Section IV, we have identified that BadRabbit
first attempts to transmit packets on ports 445 and 139 to
all network devices without consideration for whether they
are active or inactive systems. Therefore, installing a trap
system (honeypot) on the network and ensuring that it cannot,
or is not, accessed by legitimate network devices is an appro-
priate solution for detecting suspicious activities, especially
BadRabbit. For this, an application that works on the top of
the controller is implemented to monitor the SMB and HTTP
connections directed to the honeypot system, and that blocks
systems that try to access it. Figure 19 presents the steps for
the proposed approach to detect suspicious activities at the
SDN network level using a honeypot.
FIGURE 19. Conceptual design of Honeypot detection framework.
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Algorithm 3 explains the honeypot-based detection
method. The steps to be taken when a new packet is received
are as follows:
1) The switch forwards the first packet of each new con-
nection to the controller.
2) The controller inspects the packet header to identify
HTTP and SMB packets.
3) If the packet is HTTP or SMB, the controller inspects
the header to identify the destination IP address.
4) Then, the controller matches the packet destination
IP address with the honeypot IP address.
5) If the packet is directed to the honeypot, a new rule
will be created and enforced to prohibit the sender
IP address from communicating within the network
using the destination port or, if not, the controller will
direct the packet to the switch.





if packet is None then
return
else if packet.dstport == 445 or 80 then
IP = PacketIn.ipv4
ipaddress = IP.dstip
if ipaddress == HoneypotIP then
Install new entry to block the sender IP







D. MODULE 4: ARP SCANNING-BASED DETECTION
According to Rouka et al. [17], detecting network scans
may represent an effective solution to the detection of
malware activity, and thus the detection of BadRabbit is
possible using this approach. Based on the results of our
analysis, BadRabbit performs a network scan using ARP.
Consequently, the method presented in [17] can be used to
detect BadRabbit. Figure 20 gives a high-level explanation of
how this module operates.
Algorithm 4 describes the ARP scanning based detection
method. The module relies on the dict function in Python to
store two values: the originating address for ARP requests
and the number of unanswered requests. The ARP library in
POX can be used to determine whether the packet is ARP or
otherwise, and also to specify requests and responses. This
application implements the following steps:
FIGURE 20. Conceptual design of ARP scanning detection framework.
1) Parses incoming packets and identifies ARP packets
using the ARP_TYPE function.
2) If the packet is ARP, the source IP address is checked
to compare it with 0.0.0.0. This step helps to decrease
the possibility of false positive, as this IP address is
used by new clients on the network that have yet to be
assigned an IP address [28]. As a result, if the source
IP address is 0.0.0.0, the packet will be forwarded to
the forwarding.l2_learning component.
3) If the packet does not originate from 0.0.0.0, the ARP
state is determined as either request or reply.
4) Increase 1 to the source MAC address if it is a request,
and decrease 1 to the receiver MAC address if it is a
reply.
5) If the number of unanswered requests is greater than
a predefined threshold (say 5), a new rule is installed
to block the source MAC address from communi-
cating within the network for a predefined duration
(e.g., 20 minutes).
E. MODULE 5: SMB PACKET SIZE CHECKER
According to the results of our BadRabbit analysis, the
system infected with BadRabbit will exchange with the
benign system three consecutive SMB packets of a fixed and
unique size. Thus, a BadRabbit-detecting application can be
designed based on these characteristics. It is worth noting that
traffic characteristics have also been used by other works to
detect ransomware in SDN networks [14], [15]. These solu-
tions, however, analyse HTTP and HTTPS traffic rather than
the SMB traffic. Figure 21 gives a high-level explanation of
how this approach works, while Figure 22 shows the process
of exchanging the first three packets between the infected
system and the benign system.
Algorithm 5 illustrates the SMB packet size checker appli-
cation.. This application extracts the size of each incoming
SMB packet to port 445 to compare it with the three afore-
mentioned values and then stores the sender MAC address
and the number of suspicious SMB packets in a dictionary.
It then blocks the sender MAC address in the event that the
number of suspicious sent packets exceed a certain threshold
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if packet is None then
return
if packet.payload.protosrc == IPAddr(‘‘0.0.0.0’’) then
return
if packet.payload.opcode == arp.REQUEST then
Add the MAC source to the dictionary
Values and increase one to the No field
if No > 5 then
Install new entry to block the sender MAC
address from communicating within the network
else
return
if packet.payload.opcode == arp.REPLY then





FIGURE 21. Conceptual design of the SMB packet size detection
framework.
FIGURE 22. BadRabbit SMB negotiation.
(e.g. three packets). This approach applies the following steps
to address suspicious SMB traffic:
1) Parse incoming SMB packets to port 445.
2) Extract the size of each SMB packet using the len
function.
3) Compare the size of the packet with predefined sizes
(145, 238, 250).
4) In case of a match, the MAC address of the source and
a value of 1 are stored in a directory, so that the value
is increased by one for each matching case.
5) If the number of suspicious packets exceeds the
threshold (e.g., three packets), the MAC address of
the source is blocked through installing a rule that
instructs the switches to block all incoming connec-
tions from the blocked source for a predefined duration
(e.g., 20 minutes).





if packet is None then
return
else if packet.dstport == 445 then
PacketSize = len(packet)
if PacketSize == 145 or 238 or 250 then
Add the MAC source to the dictionary
Suspicious_size
and increase one to the No field
if No > 3 then
Install new entry to block the associated MAC
address from










VI. RANSOMWARE DETECTION SYSTEM:
IMPLEMENTATION
The IDPS has been implemented on top of the POX controller.
The implementation of the five modules relies on a PacketIn
event. It is created when a new packet arrives at the switch
and does not match any of the entries in the forwarding tables,
or there is an entry in the table that includes a procedure that
specifies the packet transmission to the controller [29]. Con-
sequently, when a packet reaches the switch and has nomatch,
it will be directed to the controller.Moreover, the launch func-
tion was used to initialize the application, as this is required
for the applications to function properly [29]. Our developed
code can be found on GitHub [30].
To implement the IDPS modules, an SDN testbed has
been configured and used. This testbed includes Ubuntu
16.04.6 LTS as a physical machine that hosts five other
systems through the use of the VirtualBox virtualization
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environment. The Ubuntu machine also acts as an Open
vSwitch, while the VMs work as follows: REMnux, as a
fake DNS and HTTP server using the INetSim tool, three
Windows systems, two of which run Windows 10 and one
runs Windows 7, and where one of the Windows 10 acts as
an infected system, while the other two systems are benign.
Furthermore, the Ubuntu machine has been utilized to work
as a POX controller. Figure 23 details the testbed topology
and configuration.
FIGURE 23. SDN testbed topology and configuration.
A. MODULE 1: DPI
To implement this module (Algorithm 1), the libopen-
flow_01.pyfile in the POX/Openflow foldermust bemodified
(the modification will be made to the POX utility in the con-
troller system). This file has a variable that restricts the num-
ber of bytes transferred to the controller. Hence, the attribute
miss_send_len in libopenflow_01.py file has been mod-
ified from 128 to 1600. Whilst the command ./pox.py
misc.full_payload forwarding.l2_learning DPI is sufficient
to run the application, it is possible to add new compo-
nents to enable appropriate notifications. The full command
for this is as follows: $./pox.py misc.full_payload forward-
ing.l2_learning DPI samples.pretty_log log.level ––DEBUG
info.packet_dump
The misc.full_payload component is also invoked to send
all the traffic to the controller without any restriction to the
size of the transmission [29].
B. MODULE 2: PHI
This module (Algorithm 2) does not require access to all
the network traffic or to the data section in the packet; it
suffices to check the header of the first packet of each new
traffic only. There is no need to modify the POX utility or use
the misc.full_payload component. Thus, the following com-
mand can be used to run the application: $./pox.py forward-
ing.l2_learning PHI samples.pretty_log log.level ––DEBUG
info.packet_dump.
C. MODULE 3: HONEYPOT
The honeypot-based approach (Algorithm 3) does not require
full access to the network traffic or to the full packet
information as is the case of the DPI based method. It only
needs to inspect the header, which is included in the first
128 bytes of each packet. Therefore, there is no need
to invoke special components such as misc.full_payload
or modify the POX utility. Therefore, the following com-
mand is sufficient to run the application: $./pox.py for-
warding.l2_learning Honeypot samples.pretty_log log.level
––DEBUG info.packet_dump.
D. MODULE 4: ARP SCANNING
The ARP scanning detection application (Algorithm 4) does
not need full access to all traffic. It only needs a header from
each ARP packet. As a result, there is no need to imple-
ment modifications to the switch or controller. Therefore,
the following command is sufficient to run the application
correctly: $./pox.py forwarding.l2_learning ARP-Detection
samples.pretty_log log.level ––DEBUG info.packet_dump.
E. MODULE 5: SMB CHECKER
The SMB packer size checker application needs access to all
traffic and therefore there is a need to amend the POX appli-
cation as previously explained in the case of the DPI based
method. There is also a need to use the misc.full_payload
component to forward all traffic to the controller, and
thus the following command has to be used to run the
application correctly: $./pox.py misc.full_payload forward-
ing.l2_learning SizeChecker samples.pretty_log log.level
––DEBUG info.packet_dump.
VII. SYSTEM VALIDATION
In this section, the experimental results of the five proposed
methods/modules are presented. Our aim is to validate the
effectiveness of each method in detecting self-propagating
ransomware, focusing on BadRabbit. Each module was
enabled separately on the controller and the ransomware was
executed on the infected system. To obtain accurate results,
reliance was placed on traffic inspection using Wireshark,
monitoring the controller’s graphical interface to track alerts,
and checking the Windows folder on the benign systems to
determine whether BadRabbit had managed to transfer the
suspicious files to these systems or not.
A. DPI RESULTS
To evaluate the efficacy of the solution, the same authen-
tication information were used on the infected system and
on a clean Windows 10 system with IP address 10.0.0.4.
In addition, an HTTP emulator (InetSim) is run on the REM-
nux system to ensure that the HTTP traffic is inspected.
BadRabbit was executed on the infected system and the inf-
pub string was detected in the SMB traffic after 7 minutes
14 seconds (Figure 24), whereas the string was detected in
the HTTP traffic after 7 minutes 27 seconds (Figure 25).
Figures 26 and 27 show the packets responsible for triggering
this detection, while Figure 28 shows the attempts by the
infected system to connect to port 445 after the ban. Although
the suspicious file name was detected, the file was created on
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FIGURE 24. Detection of the infpub string in the SMB traffic.
FIGURE 25. Detection of the infpub string in the HTTP traffic.
FIGURE 26. A capture of traffic showing the SMB packet being detected.
FIGURE 27. A capture of traffic showing the HTTP packet being detected
and the blocking of this traffic.
FIGURE 28. A capture of the traffic showing the infected system being
blocked.
the clean system, but the data was not transferred to it as a
result of the ban (Figure 29).
B. PHI RESULTS
BadRabbit was executed on the infected system, while the
PHI application was running on the top of the controller.
After five seconds, an alert has raised showing an attempt to
use SMBv1 on port 445 by the infected system (Figure 30).
Consequently, the infected system was blocked from using
port 445 as Figure 31 shows. Thirty seconds later, another
alarm was issued showing that the infected system had been
banned from using port 139 as it sent a packet that contained
the suspicious dialect (Figure 32). The packet responsible for
this alert is shown in Figure 33.
C. HONEYPOT RESULTS
BadRabbit was executed on the infected system, and
the honeypot application was invoked on the top of the
FIGURE 29. A screenshot of the clean system showing the infpub file as
empty.
FIGURE 30. Detection of an attempt to use SMBv1 on port 445.
FIGURE 31. The SMBv1 packet that triggered the detection on port 445.
FIGURE 32. Detection of an attempt to use SMBv1 on port 139.
FIGURE 33. The SMBv1 packet that triggered the detection on port 139.
controller. Eight seconds later, the honeypot application
detected an attempt to communicate with the honeypot itself
on port 445, where this attempt was issued from the infected
system (Figure 34). One minute and six seconds from the
time at which it was run, the application also detected an
attempt to reach port 80 on the honeypot. This attempt was
also issued from the infected system, as shown in Figure 35.
Packets responsible for triggering this detection are shown
in Figures 36 and 37. These attempts led to the prohibition
of the infected system from communicating with network
devices on ports 445 and 80, as shown in Figure 38. The
infected system tried to communicate with the HTTP sim-
ulator (REMnux system) post-detection, but the connection
was not allowed due to its prohibition already being in
place.
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FIGURE 34. Detection of SMB packet directed to the honeypot.
FIGURE 35. Detection of HTTP packet directed to the honeypot.
FIGURE 36. The SMB packet that triggered the detection.
FIGURE 37. The HTTP packet that triggered the detection.
FIGURE 38. Blocking the infected system’s connections to the port 80.
D. ARP SCANNING-BASED DETECTION RESULTS
BadRabbit was run and 5 minutes 1 second later, two systems
were detected and banned as they attempted to make more
than five unanswered requests (Figures 39 and 40). After
analysing the traffic and looking at the clean system that
has the IP address 10.0.0.4, it was found that the application
did not detect BadRabbit sufficiently quickly, allowing time
for the ransomware to transfer its files to the clean system
(Figures 41 and 42). This is be because BadRabbit does
not perform a large ARP scan except after exhausting its
attempts to spread to systems that it manages to reach without
a scanning. Therefore, this application cannot be used against
BadRabbit due to the detection speed being insufficient,
whereby the risk of BadRabbit being able to spread has not
been greatly reduced.
FIGURE 39. Detection of two systems that performed more than five
unanswered ARP requests.
FIGURE 40. Table entries showing the two systems being blocked.
E. SMB PACKET SIZE CHECKER RESULTS
BadRabbit was executed on the system and 21 seconds
later the infected system was detected, as shown in
Figure 43. The detection was sufficiently fast that the infected
FIGURE 41. A part of the suspicious file transmission to the benign
system.
FIGURE 42. BadRabbit files on the benign system.
FIGURE 43. Blocking a system responsible for sending three suspicious
SMB packets.
system was blocked before it proceeded to its subsequent
self-propagation steps. As a result, the risk of BadRabbit was
contained and no successful self-propagation occurred.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
In this section, we present our performance evaluation results
for the five proposed detection methods. Two modules rely
on methods proposed in [16], [17]. Specifically, DPI to look
for specific values inside the packet, and monitoring ARP
scanning. Three other modules rely on novel methods in
SDN-based ransomware detection. The performance is evalu-
ated based on five criteria: the time taken to detect BadRabbit,
CPU utilization rate, Ping latency, TCP latency, and the capa-
bility of the solutions to detect other types of ransomware.
Measuring CPU usage and delay for both Ping and TCP was
achieved by running BadRabbit, the proposed solution, and
the evaluation mechanism for ten minutes. To measure the
CPU usage, the script reported in [31] was used. To measure
the Ping delay, the ping command available on most systems
like Windows and Linux was used. Finally, to measure the
TCP delay the hping utility was used. Furthermore, in this
section, the capability of the suggested solutions to detect
other types of ransomware has been examined. To this end,
two modules (PHI and honeypot) were implemented and
tested against the NotPetya ransomware.
A. DETECTION TIME AND CPU UTILISATION
The BadRabbit detection times and the CPU utilization rates
were measured. Table 5 shows the detection time for each
module in addition to the average CPU utilization rate. The
latter is also depicted in Figure 44 to better illustrate the
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TABLE 5. Detection time and CPU utilisation of the proposed methods.
FIGURE 44. Average CPU utilisation (%).
differences. The interpretation of these results is as follows.
The PHI solution achieved the fastest detection time, as it
detected the attempt to access via SMBv1 in only five sec-
onds, while the honeypot detected an attempt to access SMB
in eight seconds. However, the attempt to access via HTTP
was detected after 1 minute 6 seconds, while the SMB Packet
Size Checker achieved BadRabbit detection after only 21 sec-
onds. It is worth noting that the PHI solution depends only on
inspection of each packet header destined to port 445 or 135,
while the honeypot depends only on detecting attempts to
access a service on a specific device on the network, while the
SMB Packet Size solution takes more time to process SMB
traffic to compare it with three predefined sizes. Moreover,
the CPU usage for the three solutions was the lowest of
the available solutions as CPU usage was 7.712% for SMB
Packets Size, 7.448% for the PHI, whilst the honeypot had
the lowest CPU usage at 6.934%. The other two solutions
achieved detecting times between 5 and 7 minutes, where
the ARP scanning achieved detection in 5 minutes 1 second
using 11.579% of the CPU. DPI achieved detection times
of 7 minutes 14 seconds for SMB, and 7 minutes 27 seconds
to detect the string in the HTTP traffic with a relatively high
CPU usage of 16.971%, which may be due to the processing
of all traffic directed at SMB and HTTP, which would quite
naturally require quite high CPU usage.
B. TCP AND PING DELAY
Our measurements of the TCP and Ping traffic delays
gave distinct results for each of the proposed methods.
Tables 6 and 7 show the highest delay, minimum delay and
average delay in addition to the number of packets that
TABLE 6. Ping delay for the proposed methods.
TABLE 7. Ping and TCP delay for the proposed methods.
were processed in a ten-minute period. Figure 45 illustrates
the differences in the TCP and Ping delay of the proposed
methods. In regards to TCP delays, three solutions achieved
similar results of the average delay and the same number of
processing packets; PHI, ARP scanning, and SMB Packets
Size Checker processed 601 packets in ten minutes. The aver-
age delay was 34.9 ms for PHI, 35.0 ms for ARP scanning,
and 35.2 ms for SMB Packets Size Checker. The difference
was not significant between these three solutions and the
honeypot; the latter achieved an average delay of 37.1 ms and
handled more packets, at 603. These four methods depend on
fewer operations compared to the DPI method, which handles
all HTTP and SMB traffic to search for a specific string.
This leads to a high delay rate of 77.3 ms and processing
of fewer packets, at 598. In ping delay measurement, ARP
scanning had the highest delay, at an average of 2.39 ms,
due to the fact that this solution relies on the analysis of
all ARP requests and replies. DPI and PHI achieved similar
average delays, at 1.63 and 1.66ms, respectively. By contrast,
the honeypot achieved an average delay of 1.84 ms, while the
SMB Packets Size Checker achieved the lowest delay among
other solutions, with an average of 1.33 ms.
FIGURE 45. Ping and TCP latency (ms).
Despite the competence that DPI provided in monitoring,
its impact was significant both in terms of CPU usage and
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network delays. This is due to the amount of data processed
by the controller. Other solutions were found to have less
impact on the network compared to DPI.
C. DETECTING OTHER RANSOMWARE FAMILIES
Two of the proposed methods (PHI and honeypot) may pro-
vide solutions to other threats on the network, particularly
ransomware. This is because some types of ransomware
rely on two particular methods in an attempt to propagate
across the network. The first method is to try to access the
SMBv1 protocol, because it contains security flaws which
could facilitate the spread of malware. The second method
is an attempt to access specific ports on all systems on the
network, mostly ports 80 and 445. Thus, PHI can be applied
to detect the first method, and the honeypot can be used
to detect the second method. To demonstrate this, PHI and
honeypot have been implemented against NotPetya. The anal-
ysis of NotPetya in [32], [33] showed that it uses SMBv1 as
well as trying to access all the systems in the network on
ports 80 and 445. As a result, PHI and honeypot were found
to be successful in both detecting and blocking the system
infected with NotPetya before it was able to successfully
spread itself to other systems on the network. Figure 46
shows the detection of the infected device using PHI, while
Figures 47 and 48 show the detection of the infected device’s
attempts to access the honeypot on ports 445 and 80.
FIGURE 46. Detection of NotPetya’s attempt to access SMBv1.
FIGURE 47. Detection of NotPetya attempting to access port 445 on the
honeypot.
D. DETECTING POLICY CHANGES
Another important issue is related to detecting policy changes
in an SDN environment. That is, when installing new Flow
Table or firewall rules, or when defining new Access Con-
trol List (ACL) policies, conflicts may arise due to already
installed rules [34].
Generally speaking, there is a possibility that ransomware
may be granted access, even despite being blocked by the
controller. The cause could be that there were old rules that
allowed this access, before the new rule was installed trying
to block a connection. As an example, consider the following
scenario. A device with an IP address 10.0.0.1 is allowed to
access a webserver through port 80. After that, assume that
FIGURE 48. Detection of NotPetya attempting to access port 80 on the
honeypot.
the device has been infected with ransomware. The detection
mechanism then installs a new rule, that prevents the infected
device accessing other devices or services in the network
through the port 80. As a result, there are two rules, one of
which allows access and the other that denies it, which consti-
tutes a conflict. This may cause the connection to be allowed
or denied, depending on the rule priorities. Similar violations
may occur due to multiple conflicting ACL policies.
Referring specifically to our proposed approach, some of
the modules, such as DPI, PHI, and SMB based, halt the
suspicious packet, thus stopping the ransomware from infect-
ing other devices. In other words, even if there is a conflict,
the infected device will not be able to infect any other device,
even if it can access it (assuming that there is a conflict).
Two other modules, namely Honeypot and ARP-Scanning-
based, could indeed cause a conflict which leads to violating
the installed rule and spreading ransomware. This is because
these two approaches depend entirely on monitoring a certain
number of legitimate packets (the number of ARP requests,
and the attempt to reach the webserver) to impose restrictions
on the infected device. Resolving such conflicts is beyond
the scope of this article and the interested reader may refer
relevant works [34]–[36].
In summary, the proposed methods achieved different
results when evaluated, with DPI showing the weakest perfor-
mance in terms of delay and CPU load. It resulted in a delay
in TCP traffic that was twice as long as the other solutions
and also used approximately 17% of the CPU. By contrast,
other methods resulted in less pressure on the CPU capac-
ity and less delay in TCP traffic. Moreover, two methods
achieved successful detection of another type of ransomware
family as PHI and honeypot detected NotPetya’s attempts to
self-propagate within the network.
IX. CONCLUSION
After performing a thorough analysis of BadRabbit, it was
found that this ransomware family does not need to commu-
nicate with external entities (e.g., C&C servers) to exchange
an encryption key. Instead, it uses a public key inte-
grated into its files. Therefore, methods used in [13], [14]
would not be suitable for this type of ransomware. As a
result, the focus of this project was on blocking BadRab-
bit’s attempts at self-propagation. We have implemented an
SDN-based IDPS which consists of five modules to detect
and block self-propagating ransomware, such as BadRabbit.
Two modules rely on methods proposed in [17]. Specifi-
cally, deep packet inspection to look for specific values,
and monitoring ARP scanning. Three other modules rely on
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novel methods in SDN-based ransomware detection. They
include inspecting the packet header to block SMBv1 access
attempts, an SMB packet size checker, and finally using a
honeypot in the network to detect any attempts to access port
80 or 445 of the honeypot system.
Thesemethods have been evaluated based on TCP and ping
delays, CPU utilization, detection duration, and the capability
to detect other types of ransomware, such as NotPetya. It was
found that traffic inspection resulted in a greater delay than
any of the other methods considering TCP traffic, while
the ping approach was causing the least delay. The traffic
inspection module utilized nearly 17% of the CPU, which
is double that of any other method. Furthermore, two of the
modules (packet header inspection and honeypot) are able to
detect other types of ransomware. To demonstrate this, they
have been implemented against NotPetya andwere successful
at both detection and timely blocking.
In our future work, we plan to test the performance and
the efficiency of the IDPS in a live network. For validation
purposes, the presence of different applications and realistic
background trafficwill be considered, as well as the operation
of other security appliances and functions. We also plan to
investigate any conflicts that might be caused by conflicting
security policies, when defending against different types of
threats.
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Table 8 reports the built-in usernames used by the worm.
TABLE 8. BadRabbit built-in usernames to launch a dictionary attack.
APPENDIX D
Integrated passwords: Administrator, administrator, Guest,
guest, User, user, Admin, admin, Test, test, root, 123,
1234, 12345, 123456, 1234567, 12345678, 123456789,
1234567890, Administrator123, administrator123, Guest123,
guest123, User123, user123, Admin123, admin123, Test123,
test123, password, 111111, 55555, 77777, 777, qwe, qwe123,
qwe321, qwer, qwert, qwerty, qwerty123, zxc, zxc123,
zxc321, zxcv, uiop, 123321, 321, love, secret, sex, god.
APPENDIX E
Figures 49 and 50 demonstrate the use of Frag and Free
strings, respectively.
FIGURE 49. The use of the Frag string.
FIGURE 50. The use of the Free string.
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